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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to relax the quasiconcavity assumption in the
standard Nash equilibrium existence results. Several papers have weakened
the continuity assumption of payoff functions (see, for example, Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986), Reny (1999) or Topkis (1979)), with various applications, for
example to Hotelling’s model of price competition or to patent races. Yet,
only a few papers have tried to weaken the quasiconcavity assumption, al-
though many games in the economic literature have non quasiconcave payoff
functions. Such papers could be classified in several categories, observing the
method used to circumvent the non quasiconcavity:
- a first possible method is to relax directly the convexity assumption of
the best reply correspondences (see, for example, Friedman and Nishimura
(1981) or McClendon (2005)). Unfortunately, the properties assumed on the
best reply correspondences are generally not derived from hypotheses on the
payoff functions. Thus, such technique may be difficult to use in practice;
- a second method is to use the convexification of preferences when the
number of players becomes sufficiently large (see, for example, Starr (1969)).
A drawback of this approach is that it depends on the number of players;
- a third approach is to enlarge the definition of a pure Nash equilibrium,
for instance by considering mixed-strategy equilibria, or generalized equilibria
(see Kostreva (1989));
- last, another answer to the nonconvexity issue is to look at particular
classes of games, as supermodular games (see, for example, Topkis (1979)),
for which the standard topological fixed point theorems can be avoided, using
lattice-theoritical techniques.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to obtain the existence of a
(standard) Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, without assumptions on the
best reply correspondences or on the number of agents, and we allow non
quasiconcavity of payoff functions.
First, for every player i, we introduce a mapping ρi : X → IR (where X
is the product of the pure strategy sets of the agents) which measures the
non quasiconcavity of the payoff function of player i, and which is easy to
compute for many games.
Then, we exhibit a condition, using the measures ρi, which provides the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, in order to
cover the case of discontinuous games, our approach generalizes the main
result of Reny (1999). More precisely, our main condition says that for every
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non equilibrium strategy profile x∗ and every payoff vector u∗ resulting from
strategies approaching x∗, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff
strictly above u∗i + ρi(x
∗) even if the others deviate slightly from x∗. Since
for quasiconcave games we obtain ρi(x
∗) = 0 for every player, in this case
the last condition is exactly the better-reply security assumption of Reny.
On a technical level, the proof of our main Nash equilibrium existence
result is in the spirit of Reny’s proof: in particular, it rests on Reny’s idea of
approximating the discontinuous payoff functions by a sequence of continuous
payoff functions. But it differs in the fact that it uses the standard Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem.
The motivation for the weakening of the quasiconcavity assumption, aside
from the fact that many games exhibit non quasiconcavity, could be also a
better understanding of the existence or non existence issue of equilibria:
up to now, most attention in the literature has been concentrated on the
continuity problem, and one of the aim of this paper is to offer a new tool to
refine the analysis of equilibrium existence in game theory, in particular to
be able to localize the non quasiconcavity issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we de-
scribe the non quasiconcavity measure and its main properties. In Section 3,
we use the idea introduced in Section 2 to define our class of games, strongly
better-reply secure games, which strictly contains the class of quasiconcave
and better reply-secure games. Then, our main pure strategy equilibrium
existence result is stated and proved. In Section 4, the previous results are
extended to quasisymmetric games, for which the non quasiconcavity mea-
sure can be restricted along the diagonal of payoffs. This permits to extend
some standard equilibrium existence results for quasisymmetric games, as
Reny’s one (1999) or Baye et al’s one (1993), to a nonconvex framework.
2 Measure of lack of quasiconcavity
In this section, we define a measure ρf of lack of quasiconcavity for every
real-valued mapping f defined on a nonempty convex subset of a topological
space. The idea we introduce will be used in the next section to measure the
lack of quasiconcavity of payoff functions. Roughly, we want to overcome
the dichotomy ”to be quasiconcave or not to be quasiconcave”, by defining
a local index of non quasiconcavity.
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For every n ∈ IN∗, let ∆n−1 be the simplex of Rn, defined by
∆n−1 = {(t1, ..., tn) ∈ R
n
+,
n∑
i=1
ti = 1}.
Let X be a topological vector space. For every n ∈ IN∗, t ∈ ∆n−1 and
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ X
n, we denote t · x =
n∑
i=1
tixi. Let Y be a convex subset of X,
and consider a mapping f : Y → R.
Recall that f is said to be quasiconcave if the following condition is true:
∀n ∈ IN∗, ∀(t, y) ∈ ∆n−1 × Y n, f(t · y) ≥ min{f(y1), ..., f(yn)}.
Now, we propose to measure how much the previous inequality can be false
at x ∈ Y . For this purpose, we introduce the mapping πf (x) defined as
follows:
πf (x) = −f(x) + sup
n∈N∗, (t,y)∈∆n−1×Y n, t·y=x
min{f(y1), ..., f(yn)}
Our final measure of lack of quasiconcavity of f is the upper semi-continuous
regularization of the previous mapping:
∀x ∈ Y, ρf (x) = lim sup
x′→x
πf (x
′).
Definition 2.1 The mapping ρf defined above is called the measure of lack
of quasiconcavity of f
Remark 2.1 If f is not bounded, ρf (x) may be equal to +∞ for some x ∈ Y .
Figure 1 gives an example of non quasiconcave mapping and of its measure
of lack of quasiconcavity. Now, the following proposition summarizes all the
important properties satisfied by ρf .
Proposition 2.2 i) ∀x ∈ Y, ρf (x) ≥ 0.
ii) ρf is upper semi-continuous.
iii) f is quasiconcave if and only if for every x ∈ Y, ρf (x) = 0.
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Figure 1: graph of a non-quasiconcave mapping f and of its measure of lack
of quasiconcavity.
iv) Let ε > 0 and let I be a closed range of R. If f : I → R is ε-non-
decreasing or ε-non-increasing1 then for every x ∈ I, ρf (x) ≤ ε.
v) Let ε > 0. If f : Y → R is ε−quasiconcave2 then for every x ∈
Y, ρf (x) ≤ ε.
vi) Let ε > 0. If f : Y → R is ε−concave3 then for every x ∈ Y, ρf (x) ≤
ε.
vii) If ‖f‖∞ = sup
x∈Y
| f(x) | is finite, then for every x ∈ Y, ρf (x) ≤
2.‖f‖∞.
viii) If f is continuous, if X is a N-dimensional vector space and if Y is
compact, then one has:
∀x ∈ Y, ρf (x) = −f(x) + max
t∈∆N , y∈Y N+1, t·y=x
min{f(y1), ..., f(yN+1)}.
ix) If f is continuous and Y is a non-empty compact and convex subset
1A mapping f : I → R is ε-non-decreasing (resp. ε-non-increasing) if for every (x, y) ∈
I2, x ≤ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y) + ε (resp. for every (x, y) ∈ I2, x ≤ y implies f(x) ≥
f(y) + ε).
2A mapping f : Y → R is ε−quasiconcave if for every n ∈ IN∗, x ∈ Y n and t ∈ ∆n−1,
one has f(t.x) ≥ min{f(x1), ..., f(xn)}+ ε.
3A mapping f : Y → R is ε−concave if for every n ∈ IN∗, x ∈ Y n and t ∈ ∆n−1, one
has f(t.x) ≥
n∑
k=1
ti.f(xi) + ε
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of IR, then
∀x ∈ Y, ρf (x) = −f(x) + min{max
y≤x
f(y),max
z≥x
f(z)}.
x) Let f˜ be the quasiconcave hull of f (see [5], p.33), defined by
f˜ = inf{h : Y → R, f ≤ h, h quasiconcave}.
Then, πf (x) = f˜(x)− f(x).
Remark 2.2 The last property x) provides another possible definition of ρf :
it is the upper semi-continuous regularization of the distance between f and
its quasiconcave hull. For a practical purpose, it is the definition we shall
often use.
3 The class of strongly better-reply secure
games
The aim of this section is to define a class of non quasiconcave games for which
a Nash equilibrium exists. First, in the following subsection, we extend the
definition of the measure of lack of quasiconcavity to payoff functions.
3.1 Definition of a game and measure of lack of quasi-
concavity of payoff functions
Consider a game with N players. The pure strategy set of each player i,
denoted by Xi, is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of a topological
vector space. Each agent i has a bounded payoff function
ui : X =
N∏
i=1
Xi → R.
A game G is a couple G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1). Throughout this paper, a game
G satisfying the above assumptions will be called a compact game.
For every x ∈ X and every i ∈ {1, ..., N}, we denote
x−i = (xj)j 6=i,
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and
X−i = Πj 6=iXj.
We say that the game G is quasiconcave if for every player i and every
strategy x−i ∈ X−i, the mapping ui(., x−i), defined on Xi, is quasiconcave.
Recall that x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
N) ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for every player
i, one has
∀xi ∈ Xi, ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi, x
∗
−i).
For instance, it is well known that for every compact and quasiconcave
game, if the payoff functions are continuous then there exists a Nash equi-
librium.
To weaken the standard quasiconcavity assumption, we introduce the
measure of lack of quasiconcavity of payoff funtions as follows, using the
previous section: in the following definition, for every player i and every
x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X, ui(., x−i) denotes the mapping defined from Xi to R by
ui(., x−i)(xi) = ui(x) for every xi ∈ Xi.
Definition 3.1 For every i = 1, ..., N and every x ∈ X, we define the mea-
sure ρi : X → R of lack of quasiconcavity of player i’s payoff function as
follows:
ρi(x) = lim sup
x′→x
πui(.,x′−i)(x
′
i),
where the definition of π is given in Section 2.
Thus, from Statement x) of Proposition 2.2, the measure ρi : X → R
of lack of quasiconcavity of player i’s payoff function at x = (xi, x−i) is the
upper semi-continuous regularization (with respect to the strategy profile x)
at x of the distance between the quasiconcave hull u˜i of ui (with respect to
the action of player i) and ui. Clearly, for every x ∈ X, ρi(x) ≥ 0, and a
compact game G is quasiconcave if and only if one has ρi = 0 for every player
i. Besides, by definition, ρi is upper semi-continuous.
3.2 The class of better-reply secure games
Before defining our class of games, we recall the definition of better-reply
secure games. This notion was introduced by Reny (1999), who has proved
that every quasiconcave, compact and better-reply secure game has a Nash
equilibrium, thus extending most of the previous Nash equilibrium existence
results.
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Let u = (u1, ..., uN) ∈ R
N and let Γ = {(x, u(x)), x ∈ X}.
Definition 3.2 Player i can secure a payoff strictly above ui ∈ R at x =
(xi, x−i) ∈ X if there exists x
′
i ∈ Xi and Vx−i, an open neighborhood of x−i,
such that
∀x′−i ∈ Vx−i , ui(x
′
i, x
′
−i) > ui.
Notice that Player i can secure a payoff strictly above ui at x = (xi, x−i) ∈
X if and only if
sup
x′
i
∈Xi
lim inf
x′
−i
→x−i
ui(x
′
i, x
′
−i) > ui.
Definition 3.3 A game G is better-reply secure if for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such
that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i can secure a payoff strictly
above u∗i .
3.3 The class of strongly better-reply secure games
In this subsection, we define our class of games, call strongly better-reply
secure games:
Definition 3.4 A game G is said to be strongly better-reply secure if for
every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i can
secure a payoff strictly above u∗i + ρi(x
∗).
Remark 3.1 Clearly, our definition strengthens Reny’s Definition: every
strongly better-reply secure game is better-reply secure. But the class of com-
pact and strongly better-reply secure games strictly generalizes the class of
compact, quasiconcave and better-reply secure games, as stated in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 3.5 If a game G is quasiconcave, then it is strongly better-
reply secure if and only if it is better reply secure. Moreover, there exists
some compact games which are strongly better-reply secure and which are not
quasiconcave.
Proof. The first assertion is clear, since one has ρi = 0 for every quasiconcave
game and every player i. To prove the second assertion, see Example 1 and
Example 2 of Section 3 or Example 3 of Section 4, where are defined compact
games which are strongly better-reply secure and which are not quasiconcave.
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3.4 Existence of Nash equilibria in compact and strongly
better-reply secure games
The purpose of this subsection is to prove our main equilibrium existence
result:
Theorem 3.2 If G is a compact and strongly better-reply secure game, then
it admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof is in the spirit of Reny’s proof ([8]). Consider G a compact
and strongly better-reply secure game. First begin with the following lemma,
which is a simple translation of the definition of strong better-reply security:
Lemma 3.3 A game is strongly better-reply secure if and only if for every
(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ = {(x, u(x)), x ∈ X} such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium,
there exists a player i such that
sup
xi∈Xi
lim inf
x−i→x
∗
−i
ui(xi, x−i) > u
∗
i + ρi(x
∗).
Following Reny, we denote ui(xi, x−i) for lim inf
x′
−i
→x−i
ui(xi, x
′
−i).
The following lemma will be needed in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Roughly,
It will permit to approximate in a nice way the strategy spaces by finite
strategy space.
Lemma 3.4 If G has no Nash equilibrium, then there exists a finite set∏N
i=1X
′
i ⊂ X such that for every (x
∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, there exists i ∈ {1, ..., N} such
that
sup
xi∈X
′
i
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i + ρi(x
∗).
Proof of Lemma 3.4 Suppose there is no Nash equilibrium. Since the game
is strongly better-reply secure, for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ there exists some player
i and some strategy ai ∈ Xi such that one has
ρi(x
∗) + u∗i < ui(ai, x
∗
−i). (1)
Since ui(xi, x−i) is lower semi-continuous with respect to the second vari-
able x−i for every xi ∈ Xi (from its definition), and since ρ is upper semi-
continuous with respect to x, there exists an open neighborhood Vx∗,u∗(ai) of
(x∗, u∗) in Γ such that one has
∀(x, u) ∈ Vx∗,u∗(ai), ρi(x) + ui < ui(ai, x−i). (2)
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Now, recall that Γ is a compact set (because G is a compact game).
Hence, there exists a finite covering O of Γ by some open neighborhoods
Vx∗(j),u∗(j)(a(j)) (where (x
∗(j), u∗(j)) ∈ Γ and a(j) ∈
N⋃
i=1
Xi for every j ∈ I,
I being a finite subset of IN∗). Then, for every player i one can define
X ′i = {a(j), j ∈ I} ∩Xi
if {a(j), j ∈ I} ∩Xi is non-empty, and X
′
i be any element of Xi otherwise.
The sets X ′i clearly fulfill the conditions of Lemma 3.4.
Now, we begin the proof of Theorem 3.2. We make a proof by contradic-
tion: suppose there is no Nash equilibrium. In the following, for every subset
A of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A.
First, let X ′ =
N∏
i=1
X ′i, where X
′
i is defined by Lemma 3.4. Notice that
for every i = 1, ..., N and for every xi ∈ Xi, the restriction of ui(xi, .) to
the compact metric space coX ′−i is lower semi-continuous. Thus, using an
approximation result (see Lemma 3.5 in [8]), we know that for every i =
1, ..., N and for every xi ∈ Xi, there exists a sequence of real-valued function
uni (xi, .), continuous on coX
′
−i, such that :
∀x−i ∈ coX
′
−i, u
n
i (xi, x−i) ≤ ui(xi, x−i) (3)
and such that for every sequence xn−i converging to x−i in coX
′
−i one has
lim inf
n→+∞
uni (xi, x
n
−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i). (4)
For every integer n, consider the correspondence Φn from coX ′ to coX ′,
defined for every x ∈coX ′ by
Φn(x) = co{x′ ∈ X ′, ∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ...N, uni (x
′
i, x−i) ≥ u
n
i (ai, x−i)}. (5)
Let us check that the correspondence Φn satisfies the standard properties
of Kakutani’s theorem:
1) It has convex values (from its definition).
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2) It has non-empty values: indeed, for every i = 1, ..., N and every
x ∈ X, and since the set X ′ is finite, there exists x¯i ∈ X
′
i such that
uni (x¯i, x−i) = Arg max
ai∈X
′
i
uni (ai, x−i)
and one has x¯ = (x¯1, ..., x¯N) ∈ Φ
n(x).
3) It has a closed graph, which is an easy consequence of the continuity
of uni with respect to the second variable, and the finiteness of X
′.
Thus, from Kakutani’s Theorem, for every integer n there exists xn ∈coX ′
which is a fixed point of Φn. It means that there exists an integer K and
x′n(1), ..., x′n(K) in X ′ such that for every k = 1, ..., K, one has
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ..., N, uni (x
′n
i (k), x
n
−i) ≥ u
n
i (ai, x
n
−i) (6)
and such that
xn ∈ co{x′n(1), ..., x′n(K)} (7)
From Equations 3, Equations 6 and from ui ≤ ui, we obtain
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀k = 1, ..., K, ui(x
′n
i (k), x
n
−i) ≥ u
n
i (ai, x
n
−i). (8)
It implies that for every a in X ′ and every i = 1, ..., N , one has
sup
k∈N∗, (t,y)∈∆k−1×Xk
i
, t·y=xn
i
min{ui(y1, x
n
−i), ..., ui(yk, x
n
−i)} ≥ u
n
i (ai, x
n
−i) (9)
or equivalently, substracting ui(x
n) to the equation above and using the
definition of π,
πui(.,xn−i)(x
n
i ) ≥ u
n
i (ai, x
n
−i)− ui(x
n). (10)
Finally, recalling that ρi(x
n) ≥ πui(.,xn−i)(x
n
i ), we obtain
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ρi(x
n) + ui(x
n
i , x
n
−i) ≥ u
n
i (ai, x
n
−i) (11)
Without any loss of generality, we can suppose (extracting a subsequence
if necessary) that (xn, u(xn)), which is a sequence of the compact set Γ,
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converges to (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ. Taking the lower limit in Equation 11, from
Equation 4, and since ρ is u.s.c., we obtain
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ...N, ρi(x
∗) + u∗i ≥ ui(ai, x
∗
−i). (12)
But this is a contradiction with the choice of X ′ and with Lemma 3.4:
thus the assumption ”there is no Nash equilibrium” is absurd.
If G is quasiconcave, we obtain as a corollary:
Corollary 3.5 (Reny (1999))
If G is a compact, quasiconcave and better-reply secure game, then it
admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Two examples illustrate Theorem 3.2:
Example 1. Consider the following game G: there are two players i = 1, 2;
the strategy sets of each player are X1 = [0, V1] and X2 = [0, V2], where
V1 > 0 and V2 > 0; the payoff functions are defined as follows, where −i
denotes 2 if i = 1 and 1 if i = 2:
ui(xi, x−i) = −xi if xi < x−i
ui(xi, x−i) = Vi − xi if xi ≥ x−i.
Clearly, G is not quasiconcave (see figure 2) but is compact. To compute
the measure of lack of quasiconcavity ρi, from Statement x) of Proposition
2.2, we only have to find u˜i(., x−i), the envelop of ui(., x−i) (x−i ∈ X−i being
fixed). Then, ρi(xi, x−i) is the upper semi-continuous regularization (with
respect to (xi, x−i)) of u˜i(x) − ui(., x−i). See figure 2 and figure 3 for a
representation of ui(., x−i), u˜i(., x−i) and ρi(., x−i).
Now, to prove that G is strongly better-reply secure, let (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ∈
Γ = {(x, u1(x), u2(x)), x ∈ X1 ×X2} such that (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is not an equilibrium.
Thus, x∗1 6= x
∗
2, because for every a ∈ [0,min{V1, V2}], (a, a) is a Nash equi-
librium of G. Without any loss of generality, one can suppose that x∗1 < x
∗
2.
Consequently, ρ2(x
∗) = 0 and x∗1 < V2. Let ε > 0 such that x
∗
2 − ε > x
∗
1. By
playing x2 = x
∗
2−ε, player 2 obtains V2−x
∗
2+ε. Since u
∗
2+ρ2(x
∗) = V2−x
∗
2,
12
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
 ❅
❅
 
ui(xi, x−i)
xi
Vi − x−i
−x−i
x−i Vi
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
 ❅
❅
 
u˜i(xi, x−i)
xi
Vi − x−i
x−i Vi
Figure 2: Graph of ui(., x−i) and u˜i(., x−i) in Example 1.
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
 
ρi(xi, x−i)
xi
x−i
x−i Vi
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it proves that player 2 can secure a payoff strictly above u∗2+ ρ2(x
∗) by play-
ing x2 (because the payoff of player 2 moves continuously when the strategy
x∗1 6= x2 of player 1 is slightly modified).
In this other example, we provide a continuous and compact game which
is not quasiconcave, but which is strongly better-reply secure:
Example 2. Consider the following location game G: there are two players
i = 1, 2; the strategy sets of each player are X1 = X2 = [0, 1]; the payoff
functions are defined as follows, where −i denotes 2 if i = 1 and 1 if i = 2:
u1(x, y) = − | x− y |
u2(x, y) = (
1
2
− x). | x− y |
In this game, player 1 would like to choose the same location as player
2, whereas the behaviour of player 2 depends on the location of player 1: he
would like to be far from player 1 if x < 1
2
, would like to be close to player 1
if x > 1
2
, and does not care for x = 1
2
.
G is not quasiconcave, because u2(x, .) is not quasiconcave for x <
1
2
(see
figure 4). More precisely, since u1(., y) is quasiconcave for every y ∈ X2, one
has ρ1 = 0, and we now compute ρ2 to measure the lack of quasiconcavity of
this game. Figure 3 represents the graph of u2(x, .) and of its quasiconcave
envelop u˜2(x, .) for x <
1
2
. From Statement x) of Proposition 2.2, and since
the payoff functions are continuous, one has ρ2(x, y) = u˜2(x, y) − u2(x, y).
Moreover, for x ≤ 1
2
, u2(x, .) is quasiconcave, thus ρ2(x, .) = 0 in this case.
Now, to prove that G is strongly better-reply secure, let (x∗, y∗, u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈
Γ = {(x, y, u1(x, y), u2(x, y)), (x, y) ∈ X1 ×X2} such that (x
∗, y∗) is not an
equilibrium. First notice that if x∗ 6= y∗, then player 1, whose payoff function
is continuous and quasiconcave with respect to x, can strictly secure a payoff
of u∗1 + ρ1(x
∗) = u1(x
∗) = − | x∗ − y∗ |, by playing y∗. Thus, now suppose
that x∗ = y∗. Since (a, a) is an equilibrium for every a ∈ [1
2
, 1], one has
x∗ < 1
2
. This implies ρ2(x
∗, x∗) = (1
2
− x∗)x∗. Consequently, player 2 can
strictly secure u∗2+ρ2(x
∗, x∗) = (1
2
−x∗)x∗ by playing 2x∗+ε ∈]0, 1[ for ε > 0
small enough: indeed, it gives him a payoff of (1
2
− x∗)(x∗ + ǫ). Thus, G is
strongly better-reply secure.
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.
4 Symmetric equilibria
In this section, we improve the results of the previous section, by considering
the more restricted class of quasisymmetric games.
Recall that a game G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1) is quasisymmetric if X1 = X2 =
... = XN and if u1(x, y, y, ..., y) = u2(y, x, y, y, ..., y) = ... = uN(y, y, ..., y, x)
for every x ∈ X1 and for every y ∈ X1. For N = 2, a quasisymmetric
game is called a symmetric game. In the following, we let X = X1, and the
quasisymmetric game will be denoted G = (X, (ui)
N
i=1). In such games, one
can define the diagonal payoff function v : X → IR by v(x) = u1(x, ..., x) for
every x ∈ X.
First of all, we define a measure of non quasiconcavity for quasisymmetric
games:
Definition 4.1 Let G = (X, (ui)
N
i=1) be a quasisymmetric game. For every
x ∈ X, we define the measure ρ : X → R of lack of quasiconcavity of G at x
as follows:
ρ(x) = lim sup
x′→x
(−v(x′)+ sup
n∈N∗, (t,y)∈∆n−1×Xn, t·y=x′
min{u1(y1, x
′, ..., x′), ..., u1(yn, x
′, ..., x′)})
It is worthwhile to note that in the above definition, one can replace
player 1 by any player withouth changing the value of ρ. Moreover, from
Statement x) of Proposition 2.2, one can relate the previous measure to the
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notion of quasiconcave envelop as follows: for every x′ ∈ X, define the qua-
siconcave envelop of u1(., x
′, ..., x′) with respect to the first variable, denoted
u˜1(., x
′, x′..., x′). Then, one has
ρ(x) = lim sup
x′→x
(u˜1(x
′, x′, x′..., x′)− u1(x
′, ..., x′)) (13)
Now, recall that G is said to be diagonally quasiconcave (see Reny (1999))
ifX is convex and if for each x′ ∈ X and y1, ..., yn inX such that x
′ ∈co{y1, ..., yn},
one has
−v(x′) + min{u1(y1, x
′, ..., x′), ..., u1(yn, x
′, ..., x′)} ≤ 0.
Thus, ifX is convex, then G is diagonally quasiconcave if and only if ρ(x) = 0
for every x ∈ X.
Following Reny (1999), we say that player i secures a payoff of α ∈ R
along the diagonal at (x, x, ..., x) ∈ XN if there exists x¯ ∈ X such that
ui(x
′, x′, ..., x¯, x′, ..., x′) ≥ α for all x′ in some neighborhood of x ∈ X. Re-
mark that if G is quasisymmetric, then player i secures a payoff of α ∈ R
along the diagonal at (x, x, ..., x) ∈ XN if and only if player j secures a payoff
of α ∈ R along the diagonal at (x, x, ..., x) ∈ XN , for every j = 1, ..., N .
We now adapt Definition 3.4 to quasisymmetric games:
Definition 4.2 A quasisymmetric game G = (X, (ui)
N
i=1) is strongly diago-
nally better-reply secure if whenever (x∗, v∗) ∈ X × IR is in the closure of the
graph of its diagonal payoff function and (x∗, ..., x∗) is not an equilibrium,
some player i can secure a payoff strictly above v∗+ ρ(x∗) along the diagonal
at (x∗, ..., x∗).
If G is diagonally quasiconcave, we have seen that ρ = 0 : in this case, the
previous definition is exactly the definition of diagonally better-reply secure
games, introduced by Reny. Remark also that since G is quasisymmetric,
in the definition above, ”some player i” can be replaced by ”every player i”
without altering this definition.
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 3.2 to quasisymmetric
games. The proof, which is similar to the Proof of Theorem 3.2, is given in
the appendix.
Theorem 4.1 If G = (X, (ui)
N
i=1) is quasisymmetric, compact and strongly
diagonally better-reply secure, then it admits a symmetric pure Nash equilib-
rium.
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An immediate corollary is Reny’s result:
Corollary 4.2 If G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1) is quasisymmetric, compact, diago-
nally quasiconcave and diagonally better-reply secure, then it admits a sym-
metric pure Nash equilibrium.
We now give an example of quasisymmetric, compact, strongly diagonally
better-reply secure game which is not diagonally quasiconcave:
Example 3 In their paper, Baye et al. (1993) introduce the following game
G: two duopolists with zero costs set prices (p1, p2) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, T ], where
T > 0. For i = 1, 2, the payoff functions are
u¯i(pi, p−i) = pi if pi ≤ p−i,
and
u¯i(pi, p−i) = pi − c otherwise,
where 0 < c < T , and where −i denotes 1 if i = 2 and 2 if i = 1. The
interpretation is that each firm pays brand-loyal consumers a penalty of c if
the other firm beats its price. It is easy to prove that this game is symmetric,
compact, diagonally quasiconcave and diagonally better-reply secure. Thus,
one could apply Corollary 4.2, or also the main result of [1], in order to obtain
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
Now, let ε ∈]0,min{c, T − c}[, and consider the following modification
Gε of the previous game: suppose that the penalty of firm i is reinforced for
p−i ≤ T − c: in this case, firm i pays brand-loyal consumers a penalty of c
if p−i < pi + ε, and nothing otherwise. Thus, firm i may have to pay the
penalty even if p−i is larger than pi
Consequently, one can write the modified payoff function:
ui(pi, p−i) = pi if pi ≤ p−i − ε(1p−i≤T−c(p−i)),
and
ui(pi, p−i) = pi − c otherwise,
where 1p−i≤T−c(p−i) = 1 if p−i ≤ T − c and 1p−i≤T−c(p−i) = 0 otherwise.
Remark that for ε = 0, one has Gε = G. Besides, clearly, Gε is symmetric
and compact. We now prove that it is strongly diagonally better-reply secure.
First, we compute ρ, the measure of non quasi-concavity of Gε. For this
purpose, recall that for every p2 ∈ [0, T ], u˜1(., p2) denotes the quasiconcave
17
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envelop of the mapping u1(., p2), defined in Section 2. Now, consider the
three following cases:
i) Suppose p2 < ε (which implies p2 < T − c). In this case, one has
u1(p1, p2) = p1 − c for every p1 ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, the mapping u1(., p2) is
quasiconcave, and u˜1(p1, p2) = p1 − c for every p1 ∈ [0, T ].
ii) Suppose p2 ∈ [ε, T − c]. One has u1(p1, p2) = p1 if p1 ≤ p2 − ε and
u1(p1, p2) = p1−c if p1 > p2−ǫ. Thus (see figure 5), one has u˜1(p1, p2) = p1 if
p1 ≤ p2−ε, u˜1(p1, p2) = p2−ε if p1 ∈ [p2−ǫ, p2+c−ε] and u˜1(p1, p2) = p1−c
if p1 > p2 + c− ε.
iii) Last, suppose p2 > T − c. One has u1(p1, p2) = p1 if p1 ≤ p2, and
u1(p1, p2) = p2 − c if p1 > p2. Thus (see figure 5), one has u˜1(p1, p2) = p if
p1 ≤ p2, and u˜1(p1, p2) = T − c if p1 > p2
From the three previous cases, one has u˜1(p, p)−u1(p, p) = 0 for every p <
ε, u˜1(p, p)−u1(p, p) = c− ǫ for every p ∈ [ε, T − c] and u˜1(p, p)−u1(p, p) = 0
for every p > T − c. Thus, from Equation 13, one obtains ρ(p) = 0 for every
p < ε, ρ(p) = c− ǫ for every p ∈ [ε, T − c] and ρ(p) = 0 for every p > T − c.
Eventually, to prove that Gε is strongly diagonally better-reply secure,
consider (p∗, v∗) in the closure of the graph of its diagonal payoff function,
such that (p∗, p∗) is not an equilibrium. Thus p∗ ≤ T − c, because for every
p > T−c, (p, p) is an equilibrium (see figure 5). Now, if p∗ < ε then consumer
1 can strictly secure v∗ + ρ(p∗) = v∗ = p∗ − c by playing strictly above p∗.
On the other hand, if p∗ ∈ [ε, T − c], then consumer 1 can strictly secure
v∗ + ρ(p∗) = p∗ − c+ c− ε = p∗ − ε by playing p∗ + c.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.2. To prove i), notice that for every x ∈ Y , πf (x) ≥
0, since one can take y = (x, x, ..., x) in the supremum of the definition of πf .
For ii), just recall that ρf (x) is the upper limit of πf at x. For Statement iii),
just notice that f is quasiconcave if and only if for every x ∈ Y, πf (x) = 0.
To prove iv), let x ∈ Y , n ∈ IN∗, (t, y) ∈ ∆n−1 × Y n such that t · y = x. Let
yi = min{y1, ..., yn} for some i ∈ {1, ..., n}. From t · y = x, one has yi ≤ x.
Thus, if f is ε-non-increasing, one has f(yi) ≤ f(x) + ε. Consequently,
min{f(y1), ..., f(yn)} ≤ f(yi) ≤ f(x)+ε, which implies πf (x) ≤ ε. Since this
last inequality is true for every x ∈ Y , one has ρf (x) ≤ ε for every x ∈ Y . The
case where f is ε−non-decreasing is similar. The proof of v) is similar to the
proof of iv), and vi) is a consequence of v), because ε-quasiconcavity implies
19
ε-concavity. Statement vii) is an immediate consequence of the definition
of πf . Now we prove Statement viii). Let x ∈ Y . First, notice that from
Caratheodory’s theorem, every convex hull of {y1, ..., yn}, a finite subset of
Y ⊂ X, can be written as the convex hull of N + 1 elements of {y1, ..., yn}.
So, the integer n in the definition of πf can be replaced by N + 1. Second,
define for every y = (y1, ..., yN+1) ∈ Y
N+1 and every x ∈ Y
φ(y) = min{f(y1), ..., f(yN+1)}
and
Φ(x) = {(t, y) ∈ ∆N × Y N+1, t · y = x}.
Clearly, φ is a continuous mapping and Φ is a continuous correspondence
(i.e. lower-semi-continuous and upper-semi-continuous) with non-empty val-
ues. Thus, from Berge’s maximum theorem, sup(t,y)∈Φ(x) φ(y) is a continu-
ous mapping with respect to x. This proves that πf is continuous, so that
ρf = πf , which proves Statement viii). To prove Statement ix), first notice
that from Statement viii), one has to prove that
min{max
y≤x
f(y),max
z≥x
f(z)} = max
t∈[0,1], (y,z)∈Y 2, ty+(1−t)z=x
min{f(y), f(z))}
Clearly, one has
min{max
y≤x
f(y),max
z≥x
f(z)} ≥ max
t∈[0,1], (y,z)∈Y 2, ty+(1−t)z=x
min{f(y), f(z))}.
To prove the converse inequality, we notice that there exists some y0 ∈ Y
with y0 ≤ x (for example) such that min{max
y≤x
f(y),max
z≥x
f(z)} = f(y0), where
maxy≥x f(y) = f(z0) ≥ f(y0) for some z0 ≥ x and z0 ∈ Y . But there exists
t ∈ [0, 1] such that x = ty0 + (1− t)z0. Thus,
max
t∈[0,1], (y,z)∈Y 2, ty+(1−t)z=x
min{f(y), f(z))} ≥ min{f(y0), f(z0))},
the last term being equal to f(y0) = min{maxy≤x f(y),maxz≥x f(z)}, which
ends the proof of Statement ix).
To finish, one has to prove Statement x), which is equivalent to prove
that the mapping g : Y → R defined by
∀y ∈ Y, g(y) = sup
n∈IN∗, (t,y)∈∆n−1×Y n, t·y=x
min{f(y1), ..., f(yn)}
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is equal to f˜ . We let the reader check that g is the smallest quasiconcave
mapping above f , which ends the proof of Statement x).
Proof of Theorem 4.1
For every (x, y) ∈ X ×X, let
u(x, y) = lim inf
y′→y
u1(x, y
′, y′, ..., y′).
For every x ∈ X, it is clearly a lower semicontinuous mapping with respect
to y. Besides, player 1 can secure a payoff strictly above v∗ + ρ(x∗) along
the diagonal at (x∗, ..., x∗) if and only sup
x∈X
u(x, x∗) > v∗ + ρ(x∗). Now, define
Γ = {(x, v(x)), x ∈ X}.
Suppose G is quasisymmetric, compact, diagonally better-reply secure
and suppose that there is no Nash equilibrium. Following Lemma 3.4, there
exists a finite set X ′ ⊂ X such that for every (x∗, v∗) ∈ Γ, one has
sup
x∈X′
u(x, x∗) > v∗ + ρ(x∗).
Then, from Lemma 3.5 in [8], for every x ∈ X, there exists a sequence of
real-valued function un(x, .), continuous on coX ′, such that :
∀x′ ∈ coX ′, un(x, x′) ≤ u(x, x′) (14)
and such that for every sequence x′n converging to x′ in coX ′ one has
lim inf
n→+∞
un(x, x′n) ≥ u(x, x′) (15)
For every integer n, consider the correspondence Φn from coX ′ to coX ′,
defined for every x ∈coX ′ by
Φn(x) = co{x′ ∈ X ′, ∀a ∈ X ′, un(x′, x) ≥ un(a, x)} (16)
The correspondence Φn satisfies the standard properties of Kakutani’s
theorem.
Thus, from Kakutani’s Theorem, for every integer n there exists xn ∈coX ′
which is a fixed point of Φn. It means that there exists an integer K (we can
suppose it does not depend on n because X ′ is finite) and x
′n(1), ..., x
′n(K)
in X ′ such that for every k = 1, ..., K, one has
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∀a ∈ X ′, ∀k = 1, ..., K, un(x
′n(k), xn) ≥ un(a, xn) (17)
and such that
xn ∈ co{x′n(1), ..., x′n(K)} (18)
From Equations 14, Equations 17 and from u ≤ u, we obtain
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀k = 1, ..., K, u(x′n(k), xn) ≥ un(a, xn) (19)
So, using the definition of ρ, we have:
∀a ∈ X ′, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ρ(xn) + v(xn) ≥ un(a, xn) (20)
Without any loss of generality, we can suppose (extracting a subsequence
if necessary) that (xn, v(xn)), which is a sequence of the compact set Γ,
converges to (x∗, v∗) ∈ Γ. Taking the lower limit in Equation (20), from
Equation 15, and since ρ is u.s.c., we obtain
∀a ∈ X ′, ρ(x∗) + v∗ ≥ u(a, x∗). (21)
But this is a contradiction with the definition of X ′. Thus the assumption
that there is no Nash equilibrium is absurd.
References
[1] Baye, M. R., Tian, G., Zhou, J. (1993), ”Characterization of the Exis-
tence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave
Payoffs”, Review of economic studies, 60, 935-948.
[2] Dasgupta, P. , Maskin, E. (1986), ”The Existence of an Equilibrium
in Discontinuous Economics Games I: Theory”, Review of Economic
Studies, 53, 1-26.
[3] Friedman, J., Nishimura, K. (1981), ”Existence of Nash Equilibrium
in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity”, International Economic
Review, 22, 637-648.
22
[4] Kostreva, M. M. (1989), ”Nonconvexity in Noncooperative Game The-
ory”, International Journal of Game Theory, 18, 247-259.
[5] Hadjisavvas, N., Komlo´si, S. , Schaible, S. (2005) ”Handbook of Gen-
eralized Convexity and Generalized Monotonicity” , Nonconvex Opti-
mization and its Applications, 76.
[6] McClendon, J. F. (2005) ”Existence of Solutions of Games with Some
Non-Convexity”, International Journal of Game Theory, 15, 155-162.
[7] C. pitchik, ”Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of tim-
ing”, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol 10, Numbers 3-4, 1981.
[8] Reny, P. J. (1999), ”On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games”, Econometrica, 67, 1029-56.
[9] Starr, R. M. (1969) ”Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Pref-
erences”, Econometrica, 37, 25-38.
[10] Topkis, D. M. (1979), ”Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person
Submodular Games”, SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 17,
773-787.
23
